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Responsibility, Respect,
Temperance, and Honesty:
Selected State Judicial Discipline Cases in 2018
Cynthia Gray

I

n 2018, as a result of state disciplinary proceedings, seven
judges were removed from office, 25 judges resigned or
retired in lieu of discipline and publicly agreed to never
serve again, one judge agreed to resign and was publicly
admonished, 11 judges were suspended without pay, three
judges received cease-and-desist orders, and 84 judges
received public censures, reprimands, admonishments, or
warnings.1 Reflecting that the code of judicial conduct requires
a judge “to act at all times in a manner that promotes public
confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of
the judiciary,”2 the conduct underlying those sanctions related
both to performing judicial duties, such as abuse of authority
and lack of diligence, and to off-bench activities, such as driving while intoxicated and inappropriate political activity.2
SOCIAL MEDIA

The trend of judges getting into trouble on Facebook that
began in 2009 continued through 2018, with several discipline
cases illustrating the perils of participating on social-media
platforms that judicial ethics advisory committees have
warned judges about.
For example, the Arizona Commission on Judicial Conduct
publicly reprimanded a judge for mocking a litigant in a Facebook post that purported to be a verbatim account of an eviction proceeding over which the judge had presided and began:
“In the category of, You can’t make this stuff up!”3 The post
described a maintenance man’s testimony about finding heroin
under the bathroom rug in the tenant’s apartment. The tenant
testified that the heroin was not his, explaining that cocaine
was his drug of choice and he keeps his drugs in a safe. When
asked how the heroin got into his apartment, the tenant
replied: “I don’t know. Maybe one of the hookers I had in my
apartment left it.” The judge’s post ended: “Needless to say, the
Court ruled in favor of the landlord.”
When one of his Facebook friends asked if this was a true
story, the judge posted: “Yes. It goes without staying but the
tenant wasn’t the brightest bulb in the chandelier.”
Based on an agreement, the Kentucky Judicial Conduct

Cynthia Gray is director of the Center for Judicial Ethics of the National
Center for State Courts. Parts of this article were previously published in
the winter 2019 issue of the Judicial Conduct Reporter or as posts on the
Center’s blog. For information and to sign up, visit www.ncsc.org/cje.
Footnotes
1. See “State Judicial Discipline in 2018,” 40 JUDICIAL CONDUCT

REPORTER 4 (NCSC 2019), available at https://tinyurl.com/
y4kf53oq.
2. Model Code of Judicial Conduct (ABA 2007), Rule 1.2, available
at https://tinyurl.com/y4juj9z6.
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Commission publicly reprimanded a judge for sharing a news
story on her Facebook account with the comment: “This
murder suspect was RELEASED FROM JAIL just hours after
killing a man and confessing to police.”4 The judge’s Facebook
account included her title and name.
Even if a post does not use the judge’s title, it may constitute judicial misconduct. The New York State Commission on
Judicial Conduct noted that although a judge’s disparaging
posts about a private-property dispute did not refer to the
judge’s judicial position or mention the litigant by name,
“many in his small community would likely know that he is a
judge and would recognize the property and individuals
involved.”5 The litigant, S., had bought property from the
estate of the stepfather of the judge’s wife. S. was also the complaining witness in several cases against her domestic partner
before the judge and his co-judge.
After someone filed a complaint about the judges’ handling
of the cases, the judge posted photographs on his Facebook
account, six showing the property before its sale to S. and four
showing disarray when S. was in default on the purchase contract. The judge commented: “good [sic] thing mommy and
daddy come [sic] through. (if selling do a back groung [sic]
check.)” The judge intended the post to be publicly viewable
because he was “upset” at S. for repeatedly and publicly accusing him and his co-judge of misconduct and encouraging
others to file complaints with the Commission.
The Commission found that the photos and derogatory
comments constituted misconduct.
Even if he was provoked by what he perceived as S.’s
improper behavior, it was respondent’s obligation as a
judge to observe high standards of conduct and to act
with restraint and dignity instead of escalating the
unseemly public accusations and debate over a private
matter that played out on Facebook. Every judge must
understand that a judge’s right to speak publicly is limited because of the important responsibilities a judge has
in dispensing justice, maintaining impartiality and

3. Urie, Order (Arizona Commission on Judicial Conduct, June 12,

2018), available at https://tinyurl.com/y9d9surv. The judge
referred to the individuals by their role in the case, not by their
names.
4. In re the Matter of McLaughlin, Agreed order of public reprimand
(Kentucky Judicial Conduct Commission, June 12, 2018), available at https://tinyurl.com/y9jrdlga.
5. In the Matter of Fisher, Determination (New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct, June 26, 2018), available at
https://tinyurl.com/y94vg3rp.

acting at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the judge’s integrity.
RESPONSIBILITY

Several judges were held responsible in 2018 for content
posted by others to whom they had delegated the responsibility of maintaining their Facebook pages. For example, the
Texas State Commission on Judicial Conduct publicly reprimanded a judge for, in addition to other misconduct, campaign
advertisements for other candidates posted on his Facebook
page even though he had not authorized the posts and did not
know about them until he received the Commission’s inquiry.6
Similarly, the Texas Commission publicly admonished a judge
for Facebook posts advertising a school-supply drive, soliciting
donations for an individual, and advertising his donation of a
rifle to a charitable raffle. Even though a member of his judicial staff handled his Facebook page, many posts were made
without his prior authorization, and he was often unaware of
what appeared on his page.7
That responsibility extends to judicial candidates and their
campaign Facebook pages. For example, the Florida Supreme
Court removed a judge from office for criticism of her campaign opponent for representing criminal defendants on a
Facebook page that was created by an electioneering-communications organization formed by her campaign consultant.8
The Court held that the judge’s actions, “individually and
through her campaign, for which she was ultimately responsible[,] unquestionably eroded public confidence in the judiciary.” The Court emphasized that nothing in the code of judicial conduct permitted a judicial candidate to delegate to a
“campaign manager the responsibility for written materials
created or distributed by the campaign.”
The Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline publicly
reprimanded a former judge for a photoshopped picture of herself and an actor that her campaign manager had posted on her
campaign Facebook page, which misled the public that the
Rock had endorsed her campaign, and for her subsequent
comment on the post: “I’m ‘almost’ taller than him. Almost.”9
The Commission found that the judge had failed to take reasonable measures to ensure that her campaign representatives
complied with the code of judicial conduct, noting that her
contract with her campaign manager did not contain any
restrictions on the posting of social-media materials, such as
obtaining prior approval from the judge, that the judge did not
discuss with campaign representatives the prohibitions in the
code, and that the judge failed to supervise her campaign representatives. The Commission reminded judicial candidates
that “campaign-related social media platforms, such as Facebook, maintained by a campaign committee or others, do not
insulate them from the strictures of the Code.”

6. Public Reprimand of Lopez (Texas State Commission on Judicial

Conduct, June 6, 2018), available at https://tinyurl.com/ybmfteyn.
7. Public Admonition of Metts (Texas State Commission on Judicial
Conduct, October 3, 2018), available at https://tinyurl.com/
ycm2gp77.
8. Inquiry Concerning Santino, 257 So.3d 25 (Florida 2018).
9. In the Matter of Almase, Findings of fact, conclusions of law, and

RE-POSTING

[A]t least 45

The importance of judges’
[social media]
understanding the technical
aspects of the social media they posts or re-posts
use was highlighted by a case in . . . “inherently”
which a court commissioner told
undermined
his presiding judge and the California Commission on Judicial public confidence
Performance that he had taken
in the
posts down when that was not
judiciary. . . .
true, although the gravamen of
the misconduct was the “egregious” posts and re-posts on his Facebook page.10 In May of
2017, the presiding judge wrote the commissioner that there
was a “significant concern” about the “content” of a number of
his posts and the “impression” a member of the public might
have on viewing them. In a written response, the commissioner
stated that he had deleted the posts, had refrained from sharing
similar posts, and had “designated my Facebook account as
‘private’ which means only my friends can view any future
posts.” In his self-report to the Commission, the commissioner
repeated those representations.
However, for at least four months longer, the commissioner’s Facebook page remained public, and several of the
posts were still on the page. Although the commissioner had
tried to change the page to private, his “unfamiliarity with the
technology resulted in the changes not taking effect as
intended.” When he was told that the posts were still public,
“the commissioner immediately sought further assistance,
deleted the offending posts, and increased the privacy settings
on his Facebook profile.”
Reproducing screenshots of many of the posts, the Commission decision described at least 45 posts or re-posts that
“inherently” undermined public confidence in the judiciary
and brought the judicial office into disrepute. The commissioner’s page reflected, among other things, anti-immigration
sentiment, anti-Muslim sentiment, anti-Native American sentiment, anti-gay-marriage and anti-transgender sentiment, antiliberal and anti-Democrat sentiment, anti-California sentiment, opposition to then-presidential candidate Hillary Clinton, accusations against President Barack Obama, a lack of
respect for the federal justice system, and contempt for the
poor. Based on a stipulation, the Commission publicly censured the now-former commissioner and barred him from
receiving an appointment of work from any California state
court, noting that, because the commissioner had retired, that
was the strongest discipline it could impose.
As that case illustrates, judges may be liable not only for their
original content on Facebook but also for material they re-post.
Similarly, the Texas Commission publicly reprimanded a judge
for sharing a “meme” on his Facebook page that featured a picimposition of discipline (Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline, October 22, 2018), available at https://tinyurl.com/
y865qdxy.
10. In the Matter Concerning Gianquinto, Decision and order (California Commission on Judicial Performance, August 22, 2018),
available at https://tinyurl.com/ydguvlza.
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ture of retired Marine Corps General
James Mattis with the text, “Fired by
Obama to please the Muslims, hired by
Trump to exterminate them.”11 The
judge told the Commission that he
thought the meme “showed an interesting contrast” between the two presidents’ attitudes toward General Mattis
but that he later realized that he
“should not have posted it, because it’s
not just about how [he] interpreted it,
but how others might.” The reprimand
was also for his own posts “railing or
venting” about the intolerance of liberals.

(Lifelong is a nonprofit organization that provides recovery
assistance for persons suffering from drug abuse and addiction.) Similarly, the justice posted on her Facebook page about
a weekly newspaper that employs homeless people and previously homeless people as vendors.
The Commission explained:

MORE GUIDANCE

The justice did not believe her posts rose to the level of a
solicitation, but she acknowledged that the Commission is the
body charged with enforcing the code and deferred to its determination that the posts were a violation. Recognizing that
greater guidance is needed on the increasingly prevalent use of
social media, the justice believed the stipulation would provide
such guidance and raise awareness of the risks of sharing information on social media that could be construed as solicitations
or endorsements.

[T]here is no
“meaningful
or workable
distinction
between
in-person and
written or
electronic
solicitations.”

Illustrating the need for further guidance on charitable activities and social media, the Washington State Commission on
Judicial Conduct admonished two judicial officers for Facebook posts soliciting contributions to nonprofit organizations.12 In both decisions, the Commission noted that “social
media is a relatively new form of communication,” and “the law
tends to lag behind technology.” Stating that most judges “are
quite conscious that they may not solicit funds for themselves
or others in face-to-face encounters,” the Commission concluded that there is no “meaningful or workable distinction
between in-person and written or electronic solicitations.” The
Commission emphasized that the “prohibition against judicial
solicitation of money does not reflect on the worthiness or
virtue of the charity or cause” but that “a near blanket prohibition . . . is necessary as it would be impossible to exercise principled distinctions based on the nature of the charity involved,
and it would be improper to have a government agency such as
a conduct commission make such value choices.”
Thus, the Commission publicly admonished a supreme court
justice for two posts soliciting support for nonprofit organizations. The justice’s Facebook page identifies her as a member of
the judiciary and, “[i]n Facebook parlance,” is a “government
official” page that anyone can access and that no one can
“friend.” The justice is actively engaged in the community and
uses the page to educate viewers about matters related to the
judicial branch; her posts are intended to make the court and
judicial officers more accessible and transparent to the public.
On April 22, 2018, the justice posted on her Facebook page:
Join Lifelong for Dining Out For Life on April 26!
On Thursday, April 26, raise your fork for Dining Out
For Life! Join Lifelong at one of 90 restaurants in the
Greater Seattle Area who are set to donate 30-50% of
their proceeds to vital programs that support people
facing serious illness and poverty in our community.

11. Public Reprimand of Burkeen (Texas State Commission on Judicial

Conduct, February 21, 2018), available at https://tinyurl.com/
y9nnywla.
12. In re Yu, Stipulation, Agreement, and order (Washington State
Commission on Judicial Conduct, December 7, 2018), available at
https://tinyurl.com/yava9qfm; In re Svaren, stipulation, agreement,
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While these Facebook posts present no articulable element of coercion, the Commission finds that it is still
an abuse of the prestige of judicial office. The prestige
is appropriately reserved for the service of the office
itself, and not to be used for the individual benefit of
the judge or others, regardless how generally good the
cause may be.

DISQUALIFICATION

Outside the context of a judicial discipline case, in an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a motion to disqualify in a
civil case, the Florida Supreme Court held that, standing alone,
a judge’s Facebook “friendship” with an attorney appearing in
a case did not disqualify the judge from presiding over a case
involving the attorney, the first decision on the issue by any
state supreme court.13 The Court did not discuss whether a
judge should disclose a Facebook friendship with an attorney.
The Court began with the “general principal” that a traditional friendship between a judge and an attorney, standing
alone, did not require disqualification, noting that traditional
friendship “varies in degree from greatest intimacy to casual
acquaintance.” Facebook friendship, the Court found, “exists
on an even broader spectrum,” varying “in degree from greatest intimacy to ‘virtual stranger’ or ‘complete stranger.’”
Therefore, the Court held, disqualification was not required:
no reasonably prudent person would fear that she could not
receive a fair and impartial trial based solely on a judge’s Facebook friendship with an attorney that “in and of itself” provided “no significant information about the nature” of their
relationship, indicated only “a relationship of an indeterminate
nature” without revealing “the degree or intensity of the relationship,” and did not “signal the existence of a traditional
‘friendship’” much less “a close or intimate relationship.”
The Court disagreed with the reasoning of Florida Advisory

and order (Washington State Commission on Judicial Conduct,
December 7, 2018), available at https://tinyurl.com/ yd8drd98.
13. Law Offices of Herssein and Herssein v. United Services Automobile Association (Florida Supreme Court, November 15, 2018),
available at https://tinyurl.com/ybmvpec8.

Opinion 2009-20,14 which stated that a judge may not be
friends on Facebook with lawyers who may appear before the
judge. The advisory opinion itself does not mention disqualification or the appearance of partiality. That advisory opinion
had reasoned that, because a judge’s Facebook friends may see
who the judge’s other Facebook friends are, the judge’s selection of some attorneys as friends on Facebook and rejection of
others and communication of those choices conveys, or permits others to convey, the impression that they are in a special
position to influence the judge. Citing advisory opinions from
other states and noting that the Florida committee’s advice was
the minority position, the Court explained that even “traditional ‘friendship’ involves a ‘selection and communication
process,’ albeit one less formalized than the Facebook
process,” as people “traditionally ‘select’ their friends by choosing to associate with them to the exclusion of others” and “traditionally ‘communicate’ the existence of their friendships by
choosing to spend time with their friends in public, introducing their friends to others, or interacting with them in other
ways that have a public dimension.”
In a dissent, one justice argued that, contrary to the premise
of the majority, “equating friendships in the real world with
friendships in cyberspace is a false equivalency.” The dissent
explained that a Facebook “friendship” “may reveal far more
information regarding the intimacy and the closeness of the
relationship,” noting that a Facebook friend “gains access to all
of the personal information on the user’s profile page—including photographs, status updates, likes, dislikes, work information, school history, digital images, videos, content from other
websites, and a host of other information—even when the user
opts to make all of his or her information private to the general public” Further, the dissent argued, the majority’s standard
would force a litigant to engage in “impractical and potentially
invasive” discovery to determine if there was something more
than a mere Facebook “friendship” that could justify filing a
motion for recusal. The dissent urged the Court to “at least
adopt parameters for judges to follow when engaging with
social media” and in determining whether to friend an attorney
or disqualify from a case.
One justice filed a concurring opinion to “strongly urge
judges not to participate in Facebook.” The concurring justice
agreed that “‘friendship’ on Facebook, without more, does not
create a legally sufficient basis for disqualification” but argued
that “judges must avoid situations that could suggest or imply
that a ruling is based upon anything else.” Recognizing that
Facebook may be the primary means some judges “stay in touch
with family members, actual friends, or people with whom they
have reconnected after many years,” the concurring justice sug-

gested “at the very least,” judges
should carefully “limit their ‘friendships’ to cover only such individuals.”

It was too early to tell in 2018
whether the #MeToo movement,
which began in late 2017, would
result in more judges being sanctioned for sexual harassment or similar improprieties. Even if there has
been a recent increase in complaints
about such conduct to judicial discipline commissions, those
matters might still be in the confidential investigation phase,
particularly if the allegations are extensive and disputed.
As in every year, in 2018, there were several judges who
were publicly sanctioned for sexual misconduct or who
resigned while under investigation for such conduct. For
example, a former Kansas judge was ordered to cease and
desist from offensive and demeaning verbal and/or physical
conduct toward female court reporters and other judges and to
continue his retirement;15 a Texas justice of the peace was publicly reprimanded for hiring a woman with whom he had an
intimate relationship and making inappropriate comments to
her during office hours, in addition to other misconduct;16 and
another Texas justice of the peace was publicly reprimanded
for engaging in an intimate relationship with the city’s prosecutor.17 The judges’ resignations and agreements not to serve
in judicial office again ended investigations of an Indiana magistrate’s inappropriate relationships with court employees and
attorneys during court hours and on court property18 and a
Texas probate judge’s alleged affair with an attorney representing a party in a high-value probate matter before the judge, as
described in a magazine article titled “Ardor in the Court.”19
Accepting the parties’ stipulation of facts, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court indefinitely suspended a judge without
pay and publicly censured him for his sexual relationship with
a member of the drug court team.20 The Court noted that there
had been no finding, determination, or stipulation about
whether there was sexual harassment or discrimination and
that it was not addressing that issue. The Court, which does
not have the authority to remove judges, provided that its
order be delivered to the governor and the legislature. The
judge resigned.
For approximately five months, while Tammy Cagle was an
active member of the team in the drug court over which the
judge presided, the judge and Cagle had sexual encounters in
Cagle’s home and in the judge’s office. The judge used his offi-

14. Available at https://tinyurl.com/ylrw9zm.
15. Inquiry Concerning Yeoman, Order (Kansas Commission on Judi-

18. In the Matter of Shoulders, Stipulation and agreement (Indiana

cial Qualifications, February 7, 2018), available at
https://tinyurl.com/y5w253m4.
16. Public Reprimand of Jasso and Order of Additional Education
(Texas State Commission on Judicial Conduct, April 18, 2018),
available at https://tinyurl.com/y8cb39m2.
17. Public Reprimand of Berry and Order of Additional Education
(Texas State Commission on Judicial Conduct, February 21,

Commission on Judicial Qualifications, May 2, 2018), available at
https://tinyurl.com/y8lh7pu7.
19. Peyton, Voluntary agreement to resign from judicial office in lieu
of disciplinary action (Texas State Commission on Judicial Conduct, January 26, 2018), available at https://tinyurl.com/yd7nlxf8.
20. In re Estes, Order (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, May
24, 2018), available at https://tinyurl.com/ybtgguwt.

SEXUAL MISCONDUCT

“[E]quating
friendships in
the real
world with
friendships in
cyberspace is
a false
equivalency.”

2018), available at https://tinyurl.com/y8xabvtu.
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cial e-mail account to communicate with Cagle to facilitate one
of the encounters and to devise a
strategy to prevent his family
from seeing their text messages.
Before or after some of their
encounters, they discussed the
operation of the drug court generally and one defendant in particular. During their affair, the
judge attempted to mediate problems between Cagle and other
members of the drug court team.
Emphasizing that a judge is the leader of the drug court
team, the Court stated that it had “no doubt that the Judge’s
undisclosed sexual relationship with a member of his team
raises, at the least, the appearance of inappropriate influence
and partiality in his decisions regarding drug court participants
and thus puts the integrity of the drug court during his leadership into question.” It explained:

“Comments of
a sexual
nature . . . are
inappropriate in
any professional
setting. . . .”

Further damaging respect for his office, the Judge used
his [chambers] in the court house for at least several of
their sexual encounters, reflecting complete disrespect
for the dignity and decorum of the court. . . . It is beyond
dispute that these egregious, deliberate, and repeated
acts of misconduct severely diminished respect in the
eyes of the public not only for this judge but also for the
judiciary.
Although it noted that the judge’s “performance evaluations
suggest that he has been a conscientious judge who consistently received very positive ratings from attorneys, court
employees, and jurors,” the Court concluded: “The Judge’s
misconduct . . . is serious, and his prior positive evaluations
cannot repair the damage to the judicial system caused by his
grave, willful, and repeated wrongdoing.”
INAPPROPRIATE “JOKE”

Based on a stipulation and agreement, the Washington State
Commission on Judicial Conduct publicly admonished a judge
for responding “nine inches” after a female court clerk stated
to him, “I have a question for you” after a court session.21
When the clerk expressed shock, the judge acknowledged that
his comment was inappropriate.
Shortly thereafter, the clerk disclosed the incident to coworkers. The following week, after being contacted by court
administration, the clerk reported the matter to the county
human resources department. The human resources manager
met with the judge, and the judge acknowledged the impropriety of his comment again, offered to formally apologize to

21. In re Kathren, Stipulation, agreement, and order (Washington

State Commission on Judicial Conduct, December 7, 2018), available at https://tinyurl.com/y7xhvkb5.
22. Model Code of Judicial Conduct (ABA 2007), Rule 2.8(B), available at https://tinyurl.com/y4juj9z6.
23. Public Admonition of Cross and Order of Additional Education
(Texas State Commission on Judicial Conduct, April 18, 2018),

72 Court Review - Volume 55

the clerk, and voluntarily agreed to view an online training
course on sexual harassment and discrimination.
In his answer to the Commission’s statement of allegations,
the judge acknowledged that he made the comment and that it
was inappropriate. He explained that he had intended to make
a joke to a person he had known for several years and whom
he considered a friend but that he realized the comment was in
bad taste and “should not have been made regardless of [the
clerk’s] subjective opinion of its offensiveness.”
The Commission stated:
Comments of a sexual nature, such as the comment at
issue here, are inappropriate in any professional setting,
and particularly so when the speaker holds such a disproportionately high position of power over the person
subjected to the comments. Because of that power disparity, subordinate employees can feel inhibited from
reporting such conduct and endure a workplace unsure
of when they might again be subjected to it. Respondent’s comment detracted from the dignity of Respondent’s judicial office.
The Commission noted that the judge’s “inappropriate comment appears to have resulted from Respondent being overly
casual around court staff and not showing due regard to his
role as a judge.”
DEMEANOR

As every year, many sanctions in 2018 were for violations of
the code requirement that a judge “be patient, dignified, and
courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, court staff,
court officials, and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity.”22 For example, the Texas State Commission on
Judicial Conduct publicly admonished a judge for (1) referring
to a man who was the subject of a guardianship proceedings as
“Mr. Maggot” or “Maggot Man” or words to that effect; (2) comparing the IQ of a woman who was the subject of a guardianship
proceeding to the IQ of a pen; and (3) interacting with litigants
in three guardianship cases in a manner that reasonably led
them to feel disrespected, demeaned, and frustrated.23
Injudicious demeanor was one of the grounds for which the
New York Court of Appeals removed two judges.
The Court removed one judge for (1) striking witness testimony and dismissing petitions in two cases because counsel
reflexively kept saying “okay”; (2) on numerous occasions,
acting impatiently, raising his voice, and making demeaning
and insulting remarks to attorneys, often in open court; (3)
awarding counsel fees without providing an opportunity to be
heard, contrary to applicable rules; and (4) failing to cooperate
with the Commission.24

available at https://tinyurl.com/y823b7kg.
24. In the Matter of O’Connor, 112 N.E.3d 317 (New York 2018). The

Court’s decision was based on the determination of the State Commission on Judicial Conduct. In the Matter of the O’Connor,
Determination (New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct,
March 30, 2018), available at https://tinyurl.com/y9e73pfq.

For example, during direct examination in a non-jury trial,
when Pamela Smith, who represented the landlord/petitioner,
said “okay” after her witness’s answers, the judge told her to
“stop telling [the witness] his answers are okay”; Smith apologized. Shortly thereafter, Smith again said “okay” after some of
her witness’s answers, and the judge again told her to stop, and
Smith again apologized.
The next time Smith said “okay” after her witness’s answers,
the judge interrupted her for a third time and told her to “[s]top
telling [the witness] his answers are okay.” Smith apologized
again and explained that it was a “reflex.” The judge said it was
not a reflex because she did not do it all the time, warned that
he would strike the testimony and dismiss the case the next
time she did it, and asked, “Do we understand each other?”
When Smith said “okay” after the very next answer, she
caught herself and immediately apologized. Nevertheless, the
judge sua sponte excused the witness, telling Smith, “the testimony is stricken because you clearly were leading him by
telling him periodically that his answers were okay. And that’s
totally unacceptable.”
Smith called another witness and said “okay” after the witness’s response to her first question. The judge told her, “That’s
once. Next time —.” When Smith said “okay” a short time
later, the judge struck the testimony of her second witness.
After Smith said she had no other witnesses, the judge granted
opposing counsel’s motion to dismiss for lack of evidence. The
dismissal meant Smith’s client had to restart the case, and he
lost approximately $90,000 as a result.
In several other non-jury trials, the judge made comments
to attorneys such as:
• “[You and I] have probably a different idea of how a
professional conducts themselves.”
• “[You have] no idea what you’re doing,” and “Apparently, there’s a lot you don’t understand.”
• “You don’t have to sarcastically say thank you every
time I make a ruling, okay counsel? . . . I don’t see any
other way to take it, counsel . . . . It’s obviously clear.”
• “Maybe you should do something right for a change
instead of just apologizing all the time okay, counsel?”
• “Is there some course in law school now, how to be
discourteous and how to be rude? Because if there is,
you must have gotten an A in it.”
• “I’m glad you think it’s funny . . . . No wonder people
think lawyers are a disgrace. It’s people like you who
give them that impression.”
The judge argued that his courtroom demeanor “was justified by the circumstances, including the ‘rough and tumble’
nature of landlord-tenant litigation.” Disagreeing, the Court
explained:
[T]he need to maintain order must be counterbalanced
against a judge’s obligations to remain patient and to treat

25. In the Matter of Astacio, 112 N.E.3d 851 (New York 2018). The

Court’s decision was based on the determination of the State Commission on Judicial Conduct. In the Matter of Astacio, Determi-

those appearing before the court
with dignity and courtesy . . . .
As we have explained, “respect
for the judiciary is better fostered by temperate conduct, not
hot-headed reactions” . . . .
LACK OF RESPECT

“[R]espect for
the judiciary is
better fostered
by temperate
conduct, not
hot-headed
reactions” . . . .

The New York Court of Appeals
removed a second judge for (1)
making discourteous, insensitive,
and undignified comments before counsel and litigants in
court; (2) driving while intoxicated, being discourteous to and
seeking preferred treatment from the arresting officers, violating the terms of her conditional discharge, and going to Thailand without notice to the court, resulting in the revocation of
her conditional discharge; and (3) failing to disqualify herself
from the arraignment of a former client and attempting to have
his case transferred in a manner that she thought might benefit him.25
For example, the judge learned one day from her clerk that
an in-custody defendant the judge was scheduled to arraign
was biting, spitting, cursing, kicking, and punching sheriff’s
deputies, and using racial slurs while being transported to the
court. While awaiting the case, the judge said from the bench
to a sheriff’s deputy, “I heard she’s going crazy,” and “Well, tase
her”; “Shoot her?”; “What do you do, billy-club people?”;
“Well, punch her in the face and bring her out here. You can’t
take a 16-year-old?”; “What do you want me to do, leave her?
I don’t like her attitude;” “She needs a whoopin’“; and “Is she
crazy or is she bad?”
Another day, the judge arraigned a defendant charged with
disorderly conduct for intentionally blocking traffic by walking in the middle of the road. Before accepting his plea, the
judge told the defendant to “stay out of the street. It’s super
annoying. I hate when people walk in front of my car. If there
was [sic] no rules, I would totally run them over because it’s
disrespectful.”
Another time, the attorney for a man charged with misdemeanor sexual misconduct objected to an order of protection
in favor of the alleged victim, referred to the alleged victim’s
three-week delay in signing a statement against D.W., and
stated, “It appears to me to be a case of buyer’s remorse.” The
judge laughed and told the assistant district attorney, “That
was funny. You didn’t think that was funny.” A minute or two
later, following D.W.’s arraignment, the judge stated: “Oh,
man. I don’t mean to be so inappropriate. I thought that was
freakin’ hilarious. . . . She [referring to the prosecutor] didn’t
think it was funny. . . . She was offended. I thought it was hilarious.”
The Court held that the judge’s repeated failure to speak in
a dignified manner with defendants, sheriff’s deputies, and
attorneys demonstrated a lack of “respect toward everyone
who appears in a court.”

nation (New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct, April 23,
2018), available at https://tinyurl.com/ycw2ngqk.
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The judge’s
conduct was
“sufficiently
disruptive and
disconcerting”
....

ATTEMPTS TO INFLUENCE

In 2018 the New Jersey
Supreme Court had three cases
involving judges who had
improperly used the prestige of
their office to try to influence
official action in their favor or in
favor of a friend.

• In In the Matter of Wright, the Court publicly reprimanded a judge who had involved herself in the
scheduling and processing of a friend’s custody case.26
• In In the Matter of Palmer, the Court publicly censured
a judge (a harsher sanction than reprimand) for identifying himself as a judge to court personnel when
discussing his own family law case.27
• In In the Matter of DeAvila-Silebi, the Court removed
a judge who had involved herself in a former intern’s
custody dispute.28
(The Court’s orders do not describe the judges’ misconduct;
this discussion is based on findings by the Advisory Committee on Judicial Conduct or a three-judge panel.)
The imposition of three different sanctions in cases involving violations of the same rules is attributable in part to differences in the nature and extent of the misconduct.
Judge Wright had escorted a friend seeking temporary custody of his grandson to the court’s intake office, talked to court
personnel to ensure her friend had the right forms, asked the
judge on emergent duty about the schedule, and then told a
staff member that her friend could return on Monday.
Judge Palmer had appeared at the Somerset County Courthouse, identified himself several times as a judge from Ocean
County, and asked about how to emancipate his child and how
to lower his child support payments. He spoke in succession to
a clerk, a caseworker, a senior probation officer (after the caseworker asked for assistance), and the senior probation officer’s
supervisor (after the senior probation officer asked for assistance). When talking to the caseworker’s supervisor, for example, the judge referred to his lack of a pay raise, remarking
“you the tax payers decided that a long time ago.” The judge’s
conduct was “sufficiently disruptive and disconcerting” that a
supervisor told the Somerset County assignment judge, who
reported the incident to the Ocean County assignment judge.
Judge DeAvila-Silebi called the police the day before
Mother’s Day, identified herself as the emergent duty judge,
and told a sergeant she wanted an officer to accompany a
mother to retrieve her child. The police department dispatched
an officer with the mother to the home of the child’s paternal
grandmother; the officer took the five-year-old boy from his

26. In the Matter of Wright, 194 A.3d 495 (New Jersey 2018), adopt-

ing the presentment of the Advisory Committee on Judicial Conduct, available at https://tinyurl.com/y7xgg3zf.
27. In the Matter of Palmer, 196 A.3d 579 (New Jersey 2018), adopting the presentment of the Advisory Committee on Judicial Conduct, available at https://tinyurl.com/y7gcb8qb.
28. In the Matter of DeAvila-Silebi, 194 A.3d 497 (New Jersey 2018),
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grandmother and returned to police headquarters with the
child and the mother, after which the mother left with the
child. Judge DeAvila-Silebi also “demonstrated dishonesty, perversion of her judicial authority and betrayal of the public
trust” by making numerous misrepresentations to the police
department. For example, contrary to what she told the police
sergeant, she had not received a phone call from an attorney,
no emergent application had been filed, and she had not seen
the court order regarding parenting time.
Probably the biggest contrasts between the three cases that
justified escalating sanctions from reprimand to censure to
removal were the aggravating and mitigating factors.
In Wright, there were no aggravating factors justifying more
than a reprimand, and the mitigating factors included the
judge’s sincere remorse and contrition, which had demonstrated to the Committee that the likelihood of her repeating
the misconduct was “nearly nonexistent.”
In Palmer, the Committee concluded that “enhanced discipline” was justified because this was the third time in three
years that the judge had been the subject of discipline. In mitigation, the Committee noted that that the judge had not
intended to influence the court staff he spoke to and “there was
no indication that they were actually influenced.”
In contrast, in DeAvila-Silebi, during the disciplinary proceedings, the judge “not only failed to acknowledge her
wrongdoing or express remorse or contrition” but “displayed
additional dishonesty and transcended her right to present a
defense.” The panel emphasized that the judge’s “‘disturbing’
decision to perpetuate a defense without any ‘compunction
about being less than credible’ as the investigation of her conduct continued, ‘evidence[s] that [she] lacks the honor and
integrity demanded of a judge.’”
PRESTIGIOUS PROMOTIONS

There are numerous judicial ethics advisory opinions on
whether and to what extent judges may use their judicial titles
to promote permitted extra-judicial activities such as writing
books.29 If they had sought an opinion or at least reviewed
existing advice, two judges may have avoided sanctions for
misuse of their positions in 2018.
The Illinois Courts Commission publicly reprimanded an
appellate judge for soliciting paid speaking engagements
using his judicial position, finding he not only lent the prestige of office to advance his private interests, but exploited his
judicial office in financial and business dealings, engaged in
financial and business dealings with persons likely to come
before his court, and played an active role in managing a business.30 The Commission stated that it was not finding that the
judge’s misconduct was willful but noted it was “frankly puzzled” that he had never sought guidance from available

based on the report of a three-judge panel, available at
https://tinyurl.com/ybmp3fal.
29. See, e.g., U.S. Advisory Opinion 114 (2014), available at
https://tinyurl.com/y3t8jhgl. See also Gray, “The Judge as Author,”
35 JUDICIAL CONDUCT REPORTER 1 (spring 2013).
30. In re Steigman (Illinois Courts Commission, August 13, 2018),
available at https://tinyurl.com/y9u3gkxt.

sources such as “prior decisions of this Commission (some of
which relate to the conduct of business by judges) and the
excellent advisory opinions produced by the Illinois Judges
Association’s committee on judicial ethics,” several of which
were on relevant topics.
The judge testified that he had been writing and speaking
on legal topics for decades to share his love of the law and to
educate the public. He began soliciting paid speaking opportunities after an organizer of continuing legal education seminars
for prosecutors offered to pay him $1,250 for a two-day presentation. The judge’s income was $32,000 to $34,000 for over
24 presentations over two years.
The judge made over 120 solicitations. The judge used judicial letterhead for most of his solicitations to law enforcement
groups. The judge initially sent solicitations to medical societies and hospitals by his work e-mail but switched to judicial
letterhead after the response to the e-mail solicitation had been
“tepid.” If he did not receive a response, he sometimes followed up by telephone. He had his secretary assist him with
the letters and e-mail solicitations by dictating them for her to
transcribe as he would any other correspondence. He paid all
the postage for the letters himself.
Noting that the code prohibits judges from soliciting donations for charitable organizations, the Commission stated
that, “[t]he same principles apply with even greater force
when the ‘cause’ for which the judge is soliciting is a business
or commercial activity that serves the judge’s own financial
benefit.” The Commission found that the judge’s use of stationery and other judicial resources to advance his “burgeoning speaking business was an exploitation of his judicial
office” It explained:
Respondent pursued the opportunity to give paid presentations on the law with energy, using judicial letterhead stationery to increase the likelihood of a positive
response to his solicitations and making follow-up calls
to recipients who had not responded. Respondent’s zeal
in this pursuit arose primarily from his genuine belief
that he was providing a public benefit by explaining legal
concepts to non-lawyers. Nevertheless, while his
motives may have been pure, the fact that the “public
service” he was providing also enriched him financially
created the danger that recipients of his solicitation
might feel coerced to hire him, or might think that hiring
him to give a presentation would cause him to favor their
interests in cases that came before him.
The Commission agreed that merely being paid to speak or
teach may not constitute actively managing a business and
emphasized that it was not criticizing or trying to inhibit the
practice of judges educating the public regarding the law. However, it concluded that, by directly soliciting paid speaking
engagements and following up to urge reluctant recipients to
hire him, the judge “went beyond simply earning a fee for per-

mitted activity, and instead
actively sought to increase his
extrajudicial sources of revenues.”

The judge
initially sent
solicitations to
medical societies
PROJECT PROMOTION
A Special Court of Review and hospitals by
appointed by the Texas Supreme
his work
Court publicly admonished a
e-mail . . .

judge for referring to his judicial
title and position to promote a
project that included a book, website, and an online referral service.31 The judge and his wife, an attorney who conducts mediations in family law cases, co-authored the book Divorce in
Peace: Alternatives to War from a Judge and Lawyer. The book’s
front cover lists “John and Laura Roach” as authors. The back
cover has a photo of the authors together, next to the statement:
“John and Laura have spent their careers, as lawyers and a
judge, trying to help couples avoid the pitfalls of high conflict
divorces.” An “About the Authors” section describes John
Roach as “a Texas district court judge with a true passion for the
law” and states that, “[a]s a judge, he has had a front row seat
to over 10,000 family law cases.” The book’s text does not refer
to “Judge John Roach” or “Judge Roach,” but the book has sections titled “Judge’s Perspective” and “Mediator’s Perspective”
that offer additional comment on particular topics.
The book’s introduction refers to the “attorneys, financial
planners, mental health professionals and others who are
committed to the same principles of peaceful resolution” and
“are listed at our website, www.divorceinpeace.com.” Professionals could be listed on the website without charge with a
photo, resumé, practice-area description, and e-mail address.
Professionals who chose a subscription option, which ranged
from $59.99 a month to $199 a month, could post additional
information such as client reviews, blog posts, articles, and
videos.
When the book was published, a brochure was mailed to
approximately 18,000 recipients, including about 12,000 Texas
attorneys listed with the State Bar as family law practitioners.
The brochure repeated the website address several times and
described the benefits for attorneys who paid fees to subscribe
to the network.
A series of promotional videos were made for the project.
For example, in one video, titled “About Us,” the judge and his
wife were featured with a picture of a gavel; the judge discussed his expertise as an elected state district court judge who
has presided over 10,000 family law cases. The judge decided
not to use the videos after viewing them because he was concerned that portions may violate the canons. However, the
videos were available on the website for approximately 30 days
and were still accessible on YouTube as of May 2018. According to the judge, he had been unsuccessful in his repeated
efforts to remove the videos from YouTube because he did not
have the necessary user name and password and could not

31. In re Roach, Judgment and public admonition (Texas Special

Court of Review, July 24, 2018), available at https://tinyurl.com/
yc4j7gpo.
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obtain the information from the production company in India
that had helped to create the videos.
Describing a spectrum, the court explained that, at one end,
“are plainly impermissible situations involving a judge who
directly uses his or her authority over litigants to coerce
actions that will benefit the judge financially.” At the other end
of the spectrum, the court stated, “judges are permitted to
write and publish books on legal and non-legal topics; identify
themselves as judges in biographical descriptions; and sell
books they have written so long as they do not exploit the judicial title in doing so.”
The court concluded that “[t]his case falls in the middle of
the spectrum” because the judge did not direct “coercive conduct towards litigants or attorneys appearing in his court to
compel actions from which he stood to benefit financially”
but the “circumstances involve more than individual sales of
a law-related book written by a judge.” The court acknowledged that there was no reference to the judge as “Judge John
Roach” or “Judge Roach” in the book or in the referral service
brochure and no evidence the judge was photographed in his
robe in connection with the book and website. However, it
stated that his “judicial role is readily apparent based on the
first eight words of the book’s ‘About the Authors’ section”
and “[l]ittle effort is required for readers to discern that the
‘Judge’ referenced on the front and back covers is John Roach,
and that the ‘Judge’s Perspective’ highlighted throughout the
book comes from him.” The court described the project as
“structured to create a financial gain arising from attorneys
who paid for subscriptions in hopes of being hired by readers
who acted on the book’s multiple invitations to visit the website and find Divorce in Peace-affiliated attorneys.” The court
concluded that the judge’s “participation in aspects of this
interconnected project” improperly exploited his judicial
position in business activities.
CONCLUSION

Many judicial discipline cases each year involve a pattern of
egregious behavior aggravated by lack of remorse that most
judges have trouble imagining. Other cases, however, start with
a small slip or blind spot that judges may find uncomfortably

32. 41 JUDICIAL CONDUCT REPORTER 1 (spring 2019), available at

https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Topics/Center%20for%2
0Judicial%20Ethics/JCR/JCR_Spring_2019.ashx. The Judicial
Conduct Reporter is published every quarter electronically, and
current and past issues of the Reporter are available online as a free
download at http://www.ncsc.org/Topics/Judicial-Officers/
Ethics/Center-for-Judicial-Ethics/Judicial-Conduct-Reporter.aspx.
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more relatable. To ensure their ethics radars are sufficiently sensitive, judges should re-read the code of judicial conduct at least
annually, take advantage of the resources of their state judicial
ethics advisory committees, and review information from other
states as ethical standards are the same in significant respects
across the country. For example, every quarter, the Center for
Judicial Ethics of the National Center for State Courts publishes
the online Judicial Conduct Reporter, with articles on recent
cases and advisory opinions and analysis of issues such as
“Judicial ethics and jurors” and “A judge’s discretion to report
criminal conduct” (both in the spring 2019 issue);32 “Consensual sexual relationships between judges and court staff”;
“Pornography at the courthouse”; and “Vouching for pardon,
parole, or clemency” (from the fall 2018 issue).33 The Center
also has a blog with posts every Tuesday on new cases, advisory
opinions, or other developments, and Throwback Thursdays,
with summaries of discipline cases from 25, 20, 10, and 5 years
ago.34 Reading about others’ missteps may help judges navigate
ethically when almost everything they do has the potential for
a cringe-worthy headline.
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